Codification of the inviolability of frontiers principle in the Helsinki Final Act: Its purpose and implications for conflict resolution by Sadigbayli, R.
© 2014 NHC DOI 10.1163/18750230-02404011
Security and Human Rights 24 (2013) 392–417 brill.com/shrs
Codification of the inviolability of frontiers 
principle in the Helsinki Final Act: Its purpose 
and implications for conflict resolution
Rovshan Sadigbayli
M.A. International Relations, Bilkent University (Turkey) Edmund S. Muskie Graduate 
Fellow, University of Massachusetts (USA)
sadigbayli@gmail.com 
Abstract
This article tests the proposition that there is inherent conflict between the principles of the 
Helsinki Final Act, specifically those related to equal rights and the self-determination of 
peoples, territorial integrity and the inviolability of frontiers. For this purpose the drafting 
history of the Helsinki Accords is revisited to shed light on how the participating States 
interpreted these principles and what meaning they attributed to them. It is argued that the 
overall purpose of the Final Act, which is to codify the stability of frontiers principle by 
prohibiting the use of force against frontiers as well as any unilateral, non-consensual 
actions as far as the territory of the participating States is concerned, should be kept in mind 
while interpreting these principles. The article concludes by reviewing the practice of States 
in interpreting the principles over the past two decades to show that changed political 
circumstances in Europe have not affected the interpretation of the relevant Helsinki Final 
Act provisions.
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Introduction
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) will 
be marking the fortieth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act (hereinafter 
‘the Final Act’) in 2015. In the period leading up to this benchmark event the 
OSCE participating States launched the ‘Helsinki + 40’ process in December 
2012 to review progress in upholding the commitments of the participating 
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States and to seek ways to strengthen co-operation within the Organization.1 
There is growing concern among the participating States that the princi-
ples of the Final Act guiding inter-State relations (hereinafter ‘the 
Principles’) and the OSCE commitments are not being fully respected and 
implemented.2 There is a broad understanding that streamlining the work 
of the OSCE will require more than just reaffirming the OSCE principles 
and will have to include identifying practical measures to ensure that par-
ticipating States comply with all their commitments and observe these 
principles in practice.3 However, this task is hardly accomplishable if the 
participating States fail to come to terms with each other on the key prereq-
uisite for this - uniformity in their interpretation and unreserved applica-
tion.4 This is even more important in addressing the protracted conflicts in 
the OSCE area, in the context of which the Final Act principles are often 
referred to and where the divergence of interpretations has real-time impli-
cations for conflict resolution.5
Hence, without prejudice to other principles, in this article I will revisit 
the so-called territorial clauses of the Final Act that lay out guidelines for 
approaching the issues related to boundaries in Europe6 and provide an 
overall framework for conflict resolution. It is the main premise of this arti-
cle that today a different interpretation of the principles stems not from 
1 See OSCE, ‘Ministerial Council decision on the OSCE Helsinki + 40 Process’, Dublin, 
Ireland, (December 2012). Retrieved 5 August 2013, http://www.osce.org/mc/97974.
2 See e.g. OSCE, ‘Athens Ministerial Declaration on the OSCE Corfu Process: Reconfirm-
Review-Reinvigorate Security and Co-operation from Vancouver to Vladivostok’, 2 December 
2009, OSCE Doc. MC.DOC/1/09. Retrieved 5 August 2013, http://www.osce.org/mc/67621.
3 See e.g. EU Statement in response to the Report on progress made under the Helsinki 
+ 40 process, OSCE Doc. PC.DEL/722/13. ( 25 July 2013). Retrieved 16 August 2013, http://eeas 
.europa.eu/delegations/vienna/documents/eu_osce/permanent_council/2013/pc_962_eu 
_on_helsinki_40.pdf ; US statement in response to the CIO Report on Helsinki + 40 Working 
Group, OSCE Doc. PC.DEL/708/13, (25 July 2013). Retrieved 5 August 2013, http://www.osce 
.org/pc/103991.
4 See W. Zellner, ‘Cooperative Security - Principle and Reality’, Security and Human 
Rights, 2010, no. 21, p. 68.
5 E.g. the OSCE participating States underscored that ‘[i]ncreased efforts should be made 
to resolve existing conflicts in the OSCE area in a peaceful and negotiated manner, within 
agreed formats, fully respecting the norms and principles of international law enshrined in 
the United Nations Charter, as well as the Helsinki Final Act’. See OSCE ‘Astana 
Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security Community’, adopted at the OSCE Summit 
in Astana, Kazakhstan, (December 2010), Doc. SUM.DOC/1/10/Corr.1, para. 7, p. 3. Retrieved 
11 September 2013, http://www.osce.org/cio/74985.
6 These are the Principles of (I) Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sov-
ereignty; (II) Refraining from the threat or use of force; (III) Inviolability of frontiers, (IV) 
Territorial integrity of States and (VIII) Equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
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inherent conflict between these principles, but is largely a political issue 
based on divergent positions and objectives of the parties to the conflicts.7 
Some argue that there is a ‘theoretical’ contradiction within the Final 
Act, specifically between the principles of territorial integrity and self-
determination.8 Others argue that territorial integrity does not mean the 
inviolability of borders,9 thus juxtaposing the foundational legal norm of 
territorial integrity and the consequential principle designed to protect this 
very norm.
In this ‘chicken or the egg’ type of discourse on the Final Act principles 
the purpose of this document is often disregarded. Yet, one cannot agree 
more with those who argue that the purpose of such international instru-
ments is more important than their principles, because the latter is meant 
to execute the former.10 Indeed, constructing the Final Act in such a way 
that would put the principles at odds with each other or would be in con-
frontation with the existing doctrine of international law would be an invi-
tation to renewed conflict and is against the logic and purpose of the Final 
Act. In fact, when looking at the Final Act in its entirety, through the prism 
of the main thrust of the territorial clauses, which is to reinforce the stabil-
ity of frontiers principle, this perceived contradiction diffuses.11
7 See H. Heintze, ‘Contradictory Principles in the Helsinki Final Act?’, in IFSH (ed.), OSCE 
Yearbook 2004, Hamburg, 2004. Retrieved 10 October 2013, http://www.core-hamburg.de/
CORE_English/pub_osce_inh_04.htm; S. Trifunovska, ‘Multilateral Response to Ethnicity, 
Nationalism and Racism in Contemporary Europe’, Helsinki Monitor, 1994, no. 5, p. 84; 
J. Summers, ‘The Rhetoric and Practice of Self-Determination: A Right of All Peoples or 
Political Institutions?’, Nordic Journal of International Law, 2004, no. 73.
8 See e.g. R. Giragosian, ‘The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) and the Nagorno Karabagh Conflict: A Compilation of Analyses’, 2000. Retrieved 19 
October 2013, http://www.ancsf.org/files/essaysanalysis/OSCE_Karabagh.pdf.
9 See the interview with the Armenian President S. Sargsyan published by the Russian 
News & Information Agency RIA Novosti, (21 May 2011). Retrieved 25 October 2013, http://
en.ria.ru/analysis/20110521/164145110.html.
10 See B. Simma et al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2d. ed., 
Vol. I, New York, 2002, p. 49.
11 See L. Hannikainen, ‘The Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between States of 
the European Security Conference from the Viewpoint of International Law’, Instant 
Research on Peace and Violence, 1976, no. 6, p. 96; For a detailed account of this principle see 
M. Shaw, ‘The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today’, British Year Book 
of International Law, 1996, no. 67, pp. 75, 81 et seq.; I. Brownlie, ‘International Law at the 
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations’, Recueil Des Cours, 1995, no. 255, pp. 68-72; See 
also ICJ judgment on the merits in the ‘Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear 
(Cambodia v. Thailand), Merits, Judgment of 15 June 1962: ICJ Reports 1962, p. 34. Retrieved 
30 October 2013, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/45/4871.pdf.
<UN> <UN>
Downloaded from Brill.com12/08/2018 04:36:49PM
via Bilkent University
 R. Sadigbayli / Security and Human Rights 24 (2013) 392–417 395
A detailed legal analysis of these principles from the perspective of inter-
national law is beyond the scope of this article.12 This is not to imply that 
the drafters were unaware of the sensitivities involved while elaborating 
the principle of self-determination and how it corresponds to the founda-
tional norm of territorial integrity. On the contrary, the drafting history of 
the Final Act shows that this issue was subject to lengthy negotiations. 
What is often overlooked, though, is that the participating States were able 
to arrive at an important consensus on the correlation of these principles 
and in general on the issue of borders in Europe.
Although the Final Act was not meant to be a legally binding treaty, 
because of its purpose and normative content as well as the increasing 
prominence of such non-binding agreements among States,13 this docu-
ment is often placed on a par with treaties.14 To this end, just like in the case 
of treaties, the context in which the Final Act was elaborated as well as its 
drafting history is an important means to interpret its provisions so as to 
better understand what these principles are and what they are not. If one 
follows the general rules of interpretation applicable to the treaties, then 
the provisions of the Final Act should be subject to objective interpreta-
tion, i.e. apart from the general context, subsequent developments regard-
ing the interpretation of the principles and the practice of States should all 
be taken into account.15 For this purpose, I will briefly overview the practice 
of the OSCE participating States in applying these principles over the past 
two decades and, specifically, in the context of conflicts in the OSCE 
area, to see if changed political circumstances in Europe after the end 
of the Cold War have affected the interpretation of the principles of the 
Final Act.
To analyze the course of negotiations and the individual positions of 
the participating States I will use CSCE Verbatim Records that contain 
12 For more on this see e.g. M. Shaw, ‘Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries’, European 
Journal of International Law, 1997, no. 3. Retrieved 14 October 2013, http:// www.ejil.org/
pdfs/8/3/1457.pdf; M. Zacher, ‘The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and 
the Use of Force’, International Organization , 2001, no. 55, Retrieved 14 October 2013 http://
byers.typepad.com/files/zacher-on-territorial-integrity-1.pdf.
13 See e.g. K. Raustiala, ‘Form and Substance in International Agreements’, American 
Journal of International Law, 2005, no. 99, p. 584.
14 See O. Schachter (ed.) International Law in Theory and Practice; General Course in 
Public International Law, Dordrecht, 1985, p. 110.
15 See Articles 31 and 32 on general rules of interpretation of the treaties, Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 8 ILM 679 (1969). On this point see B. Simma et al. (eds.) 
The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, 2d. ed., Vol. I, New York, 2002, pp. 48-49.
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statements and submitted draft proposals.16 Since the proceedings of the 
Stage II Geneva working sessions were not transcribed,17 in order to shed 
light on behind-closed-doors diplomacy in crafting the provisions of the 
Final Act, I will rely on the declassified diplomatic telegrams of the United 
States Government, Memoranda of Conversations with foreign govern-
ment officials and other archived documents drawn from the records of the 
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, covering the negotia-
tion period of 1972-1975. I will also use the academic research over the past 
decades on the Helsinki Accords to substantiate my arguments.18
Historical context
Although the idea to convene an All-European security conference had 
been floating around since 1954,19 it was only given serious consideration 
when the benefits of détente in Europe outweighed the cost of continuing 
East-West confrontation. Although the East-West dichotomy and divergent 
perceptions of underlying motives for the Conference were there to stay, 
since both the Western European and Socialist countries were mindful of 
the devastating consequences of the wars fought on the European conti-
nent over the last two centuries,20 they were united in preventing future 
16 See I. Kavass, et al. (eds.), Human Rights, European Politics, and the Helsinki Accord: The 
Documentary Evolution of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe 1973- 1975, VI 
Vols., New York, 1981.
17 J.P. Granier, ‘Human Rights and the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe: An Annotated Bibliography of United States Government Documents’, in M.F. 
Dominick (ed.) Human Rights and the Helsinki Accord: A Five Year Road to Madrid, Buffalo, 
1981, p. 285.
18 See e.g. A. Bloed (ed.), The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Analysis 
and Basic Documents 1972-1993, Dordrecht, 1993; J. Maresca, To Helsinki: The Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1973-1975, Durham, 1985; L. Ferraris (ed.), Report on a 
Negotiation: Helsinki-Geneva-Helsinki 1972-1975, Geneva, 1979.
19 See Memorandum for H. Kissinger from H. Sonnenfeldt ‘US-Soviet Diplomacy on 
European Security’, 8 January 1970, Foreign Relations of the United States 1969–1976, European 
Security, Vol. XXXIX, Doc. 17 p. 39. Retrieved 20 July 2013, http://static.history.state.gov/frus/
frus1969-76v39/pdf/frus1969-76v39.pdf;
20 For a comparison, 66 per cent of interstate wars fought in the world from 1815-1965 
were among contiguous states, 42 per cent almost in the same period (1815-1945) were fought 
in Europe and most of them in this way or another were about territory. See John A. Vasquez, 
‘Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality’, Journal of Peace Research, 
1995, no. 32, pp. 278 and 281, Retrieved 17 September 2013 http://www.jstor.org/stable/425665; 
J. Levy and W. Thompson (eds.), The Arc of War: Origins, Escalation and Transformation, 
Chicago, 2011, p. 192.
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conflicts emanating from violent attempts to redraw borders.21 They recog-
nized the stability of frontiers without exceptions and reservations as a 
basic prerequisite for the lasting peace in Europe.22 There was complete 
consensus on the need to put the obligation to refrain from the threat or 
use of force against territorial integrity and internationally recognized bor-
ders at the core of the comprehensive concept of security to maintain 
peace in the OSCE area.
Bearing in mind that according to the Potsdam Agreement of 1945 the ter-
ritorial questions related to Germany were to be determined at the final 
peace settlement, the Western countries resisted the surrogate World War II 
Peace Treaty that would recognize an unfavourable territorial status quo in 
Europe created as a result of war (or the use of force to use the terminology 
accepted under international law), namely the division of Germany and the 
Soviet annexation of the Baltic States.23 They also did not want to subscribe 
to a document that could potentially hinder the integration process that they 
hoped would result one day in the establishment of the European Union.24
Hence, the Western European nations agreed to participate in the 
Conference based on the understanding that the final document would not 
be legally binding and that their agreement to the final document would 
not imply that present borders were ‘immutable’.25 This term is crucial in 
21 See Supra note 16, Poland, CSCE/I/PV.2 and CSCE/III/PV.3, German Democratic 
Republic, CSCE/I/RV.3 and CSCE/III/PV.2, Federal Republic of Germany, CSCE/I/RV.3 and 
CSCE/III/PV.2, France, CSCE/I/RV.3, Sweden, CSCE/I/PV.4, Canada, CSCE/I/PV.4, United 
States of America, CSCE/I/P.5 and CSCE/III/PV.5; United Kingdom, CSCE/III/PV.2, Greece, 
CSCE/III/PV.2, Bulgaria, CSCE/III/PV.2, Italy, CSCE/III/PV.2, Cyprus, CSCE/III/PV.3, 
Switzerland, CSCE/III/PV.2, Hungary, CSCE/III/PV.3.
22 See A. Movchan, ‘Problems of Boundaries and Security in the Helsinki Declaration’, 
Recueil des Cours, 1977, no. 154, pp. 9-10.
23 See National Security Study Memorandum 83, ‘Current Issues of European Security’ 
attached to the Memorandum for H. Kissinger from H. Sonnenfeldt, ‘NSSM-83, European 
Security—May NATO Ministerial Meeting’, 25 March 1970 and Memorandum for the 
President from H. Kissinger, ‘Impact of European Security Conference on Baltic States’ in 
The Road to Helsinki. The Early steps to the CSCE, Selected documents from the President G. 
Ford Library and the U.S. National Security Archive. H. Giusto, et al. (eds.), Compilation of 
documents for the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies and the Cold War International 
History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Florence, 29-30 
September 2003, Retrieved 15 August 2013, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/
the-road-to-helsinki.
24 See Memorandum of Conversation of Secretary H. Kissinger with German Foreign 
Minister H. Genscher, 11 June 1974, Foreign Relations 1969–1976, European Security, Vol. XXXIX, 
Doc.212 p. 645.
25 CSCE Background Paper, US Department of State, April 1975, p. 3. Retrieved 30 August 
2013, http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/related/helsinki.asp.
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understanding the conceptual approach of the Western States to the issue 
of borders. It becomes obvious from reviewing the negotiation process that 
the CSCE participating States did not question the principle of the inviola-
bility of State frontiers, which is a legal obligation under international law, 
but for the reasons cited above, they did not want to commit themselves to 
a notion that borders could not be changed under any circumstances.26
The Charter of the United Nations as a source of the Principles
During the Multilateral Preparatory Talks (or the Helsinki Consultations as 
they are commonly referred to) that started in Dipoli, near Helsinki, in 
November 1972 with the mandate to sort out organizational and procedural 
issues concerning the future Conference, the participating States also dis-
cussed substantive issues such as what should constitute sources from 
which to derive the principles. The Charter of the United Nations was 
regarded by the majority of the participants as an authoritative source to be 
taken into consideration.27 It is noteworthy that although the participating 
States were influenced by the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accor-
dance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970)28 (hereinafter ‘the 
Friendly Relations Declaration’), there was no consensus on officially estab-
lishing this Declaration as the source of the principles.29 Instead, the ‘Final 
Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations’, (also called the ‘Blue 
Book’) in the section on the questions related to security in Europe merely 
stated that the Committees ‘shall take into account’ the Friendly Relations 
26 See A. Romano, From Détente in Europe to European Détente: How the West Shaped the 
Helsinki CSCE, Brussels, 2009, p. 39; See also L. Ferraris (ed.), Report on a Negotiation: Helsinki-
Geneva-Helsinki 1972-1975, Geneva, 1979, p. 117.
27 US Embassy Helsinki telegram, ‘CSCE: Principles of Interstate Relations’, dated 5 May 
1973. This and other diplomatic telegrams cited in this article were declassified/released by 
the U.S. Department of State as part of the EO Systematic Review in 2003-2006, the U.S. 
National Archives and Record Administration, Retrieved July-September 2013 http://aad 
.archives.gov/aad/series-description.jsp?s=4073&cat=all&bc=sl.
28 U.N. GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970. Retrieved 17 October 2013, http://www 
.un.org/documents/ga/res/25/ares25.htm.
29 The Western delegations sought to include this Declaration as a source mainly because 
it establishes a linkage between the principles of the non-use of force and the inviolability 
of frontiers and also contain a reference to self-determination. See US Embassy Bonn tele-
gram 1973BONN03737, ‘CSCE: Security Mandate’, dated 14 March 1973; US Department of 
State telegram 1973STATE084343, ‘CSCE: Principles Mandate’, dated 4 May 1973.
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Declaration.30 Those opposing made it clear that acceding to a reference to 
the Friendly Relations Declaration was not meant to accept it as a source of 
the principles.31 As a result, the Declaration was not included in the pre-
amble to the Final Act and is mentioned only once in the section dealing 
with the development of good neighborly relations with the non-partici-
pating Mediterranean States.32
In sharp contrast, the Final Act explicitly states throughout the text that 
‘the principles… are in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations’. It 
is generally accepted that the norms enshrined in the U.N. Charter are of 
fundamental importance and have a superior character (they correspond 
to the jus cogens rules). As such they are binding upon all members of the 
international community.33 The Final Act reaffirms the obligations of States 
under international law through reaffirming these principles and referenc-
ing the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter. The Final Act estab-
lishes an explicit linkage between the obligations of participating States 
under the Final Act and those ‘arising from the generally recognized prin-
ciples and rules of international law’, 34 thus stipulating the requirement to 
interpret the provisions of this document taking into account the princi-
ples of international law. The wording of the Final Act led some scholars 
writing on the subject to contend that the principles reflect customary 
international law, have binding character and produce legal effects.35 This 
makes the non-binding character of the Final Act irrelevant in the context 
of the applicability of the principles, since States had already undertaken 
the obligation to respect these principles under the U.N. Charter. This view 
30 See ‘Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations’, 8 June 1973, Title 2 (I)(20). 
Retrieved 20 July 2013, www.osce.org/mc/40213. Emphasis here and throughout the article is 
added.
31 US Embassy Helsinki telegram 1973HELSIN01416, ‘CSCE - May 21-25 discussion of prin-
ciples’, dated 26 May 1973.
32 See Doc. CSCE Journal No.337, p. 200.
33 See e.g. K. Hossain, ‘The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation under the U.N. 
Charter’, Santa Clara Journal of International Law, 2005, p. 3. Retrieved 11 October 2013 http://
digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil/vol3/iss1/3.
34 See Principle X – ‘Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law’. Here 
and throughout the article quotes are from the Helsinki Final Act reproduced in 14 ILM 
(1975), 1292-1324.
35 See I. Brownlie, ‘International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United 
Nations’, Recueil Des Cours,1995, no. 255, p. 81; A. Kiss and M. Dominick, ‘The International 
Legal Significance of the Human Rights Provisions of the Helsinki Final Act’ in M. Dominick 
(ed.) Human Rights and the Helsinki Accord: A Five Year Road to Madrid, Buffalo, 1981, 
pp. 54, 58.
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prevailed within the OSCE and the Final Act is now regarded as a ‘politi-
cally binding agreement.’36
Codification of the inviolability of frontiers principle and its correlation 
with the non-use of force
The drafting history of the Helsinki Accords suggests that there was com-
plete consensus among the participating States that the inviolability of 
frontiers and the renunciation of the use of force against them is an indis-
pensable condition for peace and security in Europe.37 This understanding 
is reflected in the fact that the Western European countries, which had high 
stakes in not legitimizing the postwar territorial status quo, were ready to 
recognize the existing borders as inviolable ‘irrespective of the legal sta-
tus’.38 For this purpose the participating States expanded Article 2(4) of the 
U.N. Charter that prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity of States and codified, in the Final Act, territorial integrity, the 
inviolability of frontiers and the non-use of force as separate, independent 
principles to emphasize the norm of territorial integrity.39 It was for the 
first time that the inviolability of frontiers was formulated and enshrined in 
a multilateral instrument as an independent principle.40
As was pointed out above the only question that generated debate around 
this principle was related to the potential consequences this may have on 
the possibility of peacefully changing frontiers in the future. In an effort to 
avoid any language that would imply that changes of frontiers by peaceful 
means are forbidden, a number of Western delegations, with the FRG in the 
lead, emphasized that the inviolability of frontiers should be first of all 
36 See OSCE Secretariat Press Release ‘Helsinki Final Act signed twenty years ago today’, 
1995. Retrieved 1 November 2013, http://www.osce.org/secretariat/52566.
37 See A. Movchan, ‘Problems of Boundaries and Security in the Helsinki Declaration’, 
Recueil des Cours, 1977, no. 154, p. 18; See also statements by Yugoslavia, CSCE/III/PV.4, Spain, 
CSCE/III/PV.4, United Kingdom, CSCE/III/PV.2, Poland, CSCE/III/PV.3, Federal Republic of 
Germany, CSCE/III/PV.2, Bulgaria, CSCE/III/PV.2, Italy, CSCE/III/PV.2, Cyprus, CSCE/III/
PV.3, Switzerland, CSCE/III/PV.2, Hungary, CSCE/III/PV.3.
38 See Federal Republic of Germany, CSCE /II/A/3, France, CSCE/III/A/12.
39 See L. Hannikainen, ‘The Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between States 
of the European Security Conference from the Viewpoint of International Law’, Instant 
Research on Peace and Violence, 1976, no. 6, pp. 94, 96.
40 See A. Movchan, ‘Problems of Boundaries and Security in the Helsinki Declaration’, 
Recueil des Cours, 1977, no 154, p. 13.
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understood as the non-use of force against borders.41 Furthermore, the FRG 
was insisting that these two principles should be linked sequentially in the 
Declaration of principles with the principle of the inviolability of frontiers 
coming after the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force 
(hereinafter the ‘non-use of force’) in order to establish a relationship of 
subordination between the two.42
After long deliberations the FRG had to drop its demand for an explicit 
connection between the non-use of force and the inviolability of frontiers 
principles and the relationship of subordination of the latter to the for-
mer.43 In order to emphasize that this principle prohibits first and foremost 
the use of force against borders the West insisted on the operative verb 
‘assaulting’ (‘participating States…will refrain now and in the future from 
assaulting… frontiers’) that has a connotation with the use of force. The 
compromise became possible after the Soviet Union and the Western del-
egations agreed that this term would be translated in the Russian text of the 
Final Act as ‘посягать’, which is best translated as ‘encroaching’.44
Because in the Moscow Treaty (1970) between the FRG and the Soviet 
Union refraining from the threat or use of force preceded the inviolability 
of frontiers and territorial integrity clause, at the insistence of the FRG the 
same sequence was retained in the Final Act.45 Although the Final Act says 
nothing about any hierarchy of the principles, the fact that the Western 
delegations insisted that the non-use of force principle should precede the 
inviolability of frontiers does seem to indicate that a hierarchy did find 
some expression in the order of the principles. The descending order of the 
principles is also evident in the statement by the FRG delegation that the 
order ‘corresponds to the logical place the principles concerned occupy in 
international law.’46 Thus, placing the non-use of force, inviolability of 
41 See Federal Republic of Germany, CSCE /II/A/3, Denmark, CSCE/I/PV.2, Luxembourg, 
CSCE/I/RV.3, France, CSCE/I/RV.3, Canada, CSCE/I/PV.4, Italy, CSCE/I/PV.6, Switzerland, 
CSCE/I/PV.6, Belgium, CSCE/I/PV.6, Ireland, CSCE/I/PV.6 , Netherlands, CSCE/I/PV.7, 
United States of America, CSCE/I/PV.5, France, CSCE/II/A/15.
42 See US Department of State telegram 1973STATE084507, ‘Inviolability of Borders in 
Connection with CSCE’, dated 5 May 1973; US Embassy Bonn telegram 1973BONN06568, 
‘CSCE: Principles of Interstate Relations’, dated 8 May 1973.
43 US Embassy Bonn telegram 1973BONN07047, ‘CSCE: Chancellor’s Briefing Paper for 
Brezhnev visit to Bonn’, dated 16 May 1973.
44 See H. Russel, ‘The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?’, American Journal of 
International Law, 1976, no. 70, p. 251.
45 Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting of H. Kissinger with A. Gromyko at Zavidovo, 
May 5–8, 1973, Foreign Relations 1969–1976, Vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Doc. 
107 pp. 376, 377.
46 Federal Republic of Germany, CSCE/II/A/3.
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frontiers and the territorial integrity among the first principles in the Final 
Act was meant to highlight their importance for peace and security in 
Europe.
In the final agreed text of the inviolability of frontiers principle the par-
ticipating States ‘…regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as 
the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and 
in the future from assaulting these frontiers.’ In the non-use of force princi-
ple they committed themselves to ‘…refrain in their mutual relations, as well 
as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State…’.
Furthemore, the participating States significantly lowered the threshold 
of what constitutes illegal action against the territorial integrity of States by 
committing themselves to refrain from virtually any actions against another 
participating State, be it the threat of force or direct military action (i.e. 
assaulting frontiers, seizure, usurpation, military occupation of a part or all 
of the territory of any participating State) 47 or an ‘indirect’ measure of 
force, which was deliberately left unspecified to encompass a broad range 
of possible actions.48
The emerged consensus on these principles reflected a broad under-
standing among the participating States that the principle of the non-use 
of force is linked to the inadmissibility of changing the boundaries of States 
through violent means and implies a prohibition on the acquisition of ter-
ritory by force. The participating States specifically pledged in the Final Act 
not to recognize as legal military occupation the acquisition of territory by 
force. The Final Act also mirrors the general recognition that these princi-
ples are consequential principles generated by the foundational norm of 
territorial integrity and are hence inextricably linked under international 
law.49 The territorial integrity of states is protected by the international 
legal prohibition on the threat or use of force.
47 US Mission Geneva telegram 1975GENEVA00881, ‘CSCE: Self-Determination Principle’, 
dated 11 February 1975. See also US Mission Geneva telegram 1975GENEVA00929, ‘CSCE pol-
icy: Romanian non-use of force proposal’, dated 12 February 1975; US Mission Geneva tele-
gram 1975GENEVA01204, ‘CSCE: Stage II highlights-February 17-21’, dated 22 February 1975.
48 The earlier French proposals to include in this principle refraining from ‘organizing or 
encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands… with a view to incursions 
upon the territory of another participating State’ and ‘organizing and encouraging acts of 
civil war, participating in them, assisting them or tolerating on their territory activities orga-
nized with a view to perpetrating such acts’ indicate the broad range of actions that the 
participants intended to ban under this principle. See France, CSCE/II/A/114.
49 J. Symonides, ‘The Inviolability of Frontiers and the Territorial Integrity in the Treaties 
between Poland and the GDR, Between Poland and the FRG and in the Final Act of the 
Helsinki Conference’, Polish Yearbook of International Law, 1981-1982, no. 11.
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It is evident from the text of the inviolability of frontiers principle that it 
does not limit illegal actions against borders only to military assaults and 
includes also revisionist claims.50 During the discussions the participating 
States specifically stressed the need to relinquish any territorial claims on 
each other’s territory, which is reflected in the pledge that they ‘…will also 
refrain from any demand for… part or all of the territory of any participating 
State.’51
The participating States and specifically the U.S. wanted to prevent the 
non-use of force principle to imply a prohibition on the use of force under 
any circumstance. Since the U.N. Charter lays down the rule legally prohibit-
ing the threat or use of force, the U.S. was particularly concerned that the 
reference to the U.N. Charter in the Final Act should ‘not prejudice the legiti-
mate uses of force…’.52 The FRG also emphasized that a ‘general and compre-
hensive prohibition of force embodied in [this principle] is not inconsistent 
with the continuance of the natural right of any State to individual or collec-
tive self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter’.53
Consequently, the non-use of force principle was framed in such a way 
that would not rule out the legitimate use of force by declaring that States 
are resolved to ‘refrain from any use of armed forces…inconsistent with the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations’, implying that 
armed forces can be employed, if this is consistent with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter. To put is succinctly, the general prohibition of the 
use of force in this principle does not impair the inherent and undisputable 
right of States to self-defence.
The peaceful change of frontiers concept
The question of the peaceful change of frontiers was exclusively raised in 
the context of the possible future reunification of Germany to reinforce the 
view that the inviolability of frontiers did not amount to excluding the 
possibility of a peaceful change of frontiers.54 The FRG and other Western 
50 See A. Movchan, ‘Problems of Boundaries and Security in the Helsinki Declaration’, 
Recueil des Cours, 1977, no. 154, p. 21.
51 See e.g. USSR,CSCE/I/PV. 2; Poland, CSCE/I/PV.2 and CSCE/III/PV.3; German 
Democratic Republic, CSCE/I/RV.3.
52 US Mission Geneva telegram 1975GENEVA05342, ‘CSCE: declaration principles-refer-
ence to United Nations Charter’, dated 9 July 1975.
53 Federal Republic of Germany, CSCE/II/A/3.
54 See Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs 
(Kissinger) to President G. Ford, 14 November 1974, Foreign Relations 1969-1976, Vol. XVI, Soviet 
<UN> <UN>
Downloaded from Brill.com12/08/2018 04:36:49PM
via Bilkent University
404 R. Sadigbayli / Security and Human Rights 24 (2013) 392–417 
delegations wanted this clause to be stipulated as a general rule and sug-
gested to include the language on peaceful change and self-determination 
into the inviolability of frontiers or territorial integrity principles.55 The 
FRG even proposed to insert a separate principle on peaceful change to bal-
ance the principle of the inviolability of frontiers.
The Warsaw Pact countries accepted the idea that a voluntary rectifica-
tion of borders could take place in the exercise of the sovereign rights of the 
States concerned,56 but were opposed to the idea of including this concept 
in the inviolability of frontiers principle.57 The countries that were sensi-
tive to this issue looked at it through the prism of historical territorial dis-
putes and were fearful that linking peaceful change with the inviolability of 
frontiers would ‘…justify a revanchist political struggle in favor of a change 
of boundaries.’58
They insisted that a reference to ‘international law’, ‘peaceful means’ and 
‘agreement’ be included in the peaceful change clause with equal emphasis 
on each to emphasize that frontiers can be changed, but strictly in accor-
dance with international law and by the agreement of all concerned.59 The 
Western delegations and specifically those which had territorial issues with 
neighbours did not object to a reference to ‘peaceful means’ and ‘by agree-
ment’.60 The sticking point was the reference to international law that was 
interpreted by some Western States as making a peaceful change of fron-
tiers subject to conditions besides those concerning peaceful means and 
Union, August 1974–December 1976, Doc. 86 p. 301. Retrieved 30 October 2013 http://static.
history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v16/pdf/frus1969-76v16.pdf.
55 Federal Republic of Germany, CSCE /II/A/3. See also Memorandum from the 
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, 10 July 1973, 
Foreign Relations of the United States 1969–1976, European Security, Vol. XXXIX, Doc. 169 p. 510;
56 See Memorandum of Conversation, L. Brezhnev-H. Kissinger meeting, Moscow, 25 
March 1974, Foreign Relations 1969–1976, Vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Doc. 166, 
p. 736.
57 US Mission Geneva telegram 1974GENEVA01571, ‘CSCE: Meeting with Soviet Delegation 
Head’, dated 9 March 1974.
58 Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting of H. Kissinger with A. Gromyko at Zavidovo, 
5–8 May 1973, Foreign Relations 1969–1976, Vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Doc. 
107 p. 377; US Mission Geneva telegram 1975GENEVA01668, ‘CSCE: peaceful change -- 
Romanian position’, dated 12 March 1975.
59 Memorandum of Conversation of Secretary H. Kissinger with J. Sauvagnargues, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, 18 June 1974, Foreign Relations of the United States 1969–
1976, European Security, Vol. XXXIX, Doc. 214 pp. 650-651.
60 US Mission Geneva telegram, 1974GENEVA07589, ‘CSCE: UK Views on Peaceful Change 
of Frontiers’, dated 20 December 1974; US Department of State telegram 1975STATE013326, 
‘CSCE -- UK position on peaceful change’, dated 25 January 1975.
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agreement.61 Under the terms of a compromise agreement the concept of 
peaceful change was separated from the principle of the inviolability of 
frontiers62 and was placed under the principle of sovereign equality.63
In the final reading of this clause the participating States ‘…consider that 
their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by 
peaceful means and by agreement.’ The last minute semantic edits did not 
change the substance of this formula that was watered down both concep-
tually and through less forceful phraseology. Because of the unambiguous 
wording of this paragraph, it is interpreted as excluding unilateral actions 
as far as borders are concerned.64 Placing the peaceful change clause under 
the sovereign equality principle was specifically meant to reinforce the 
requirement for consent by the States concerned for any border modifica-
tions.65 At the insistence of the delegations which expressed reservations 
with regard to this provision, the sovereign equality principle also contains 
an important safeguard by reaffirming that territorial integrity is the ‘the 
right of every State’, which is considered to be a right inherent in 
sovereignty.66
Internal self-determination as an innovative feature of the Helsinki 
Final Act
As far as the principle of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples 
(hereinafter ‘self-determination’) is concerned several points need to be 
made here. First, self-determination was interpreted by the participating 
States as a right pertaining to the entire populations of States.67 Second, 
61 US Embassy Bonn telegram 1974BONN09467, ‘CSCE and German Questions: Bonn 
Group Study’, dated 14 June 1974.
62 See Doc. CSCE/II/A/126 and CSCE Journal No. 88 (1974), p. 95. See also Memorandum 
of Conversation, L. Brezhnev-H. Kissinger meeting, Moscow, 25 March 1974, Foreign 
Relations 1969–1976, Volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Doc. 166, p. 738.
63 The United States of America, CSCE/II/A/30; CSCE Journal No. 327 (1975), p. 192.
64 Memorandum of Conversation of Secretary H. Kissinger with E. Gierek, First Secretary 
of Central Committee of Polish United Workers’ Party, 8 October 1974, Foreign Relations of 
the United States 1969–1976, European Security, Vol. XXXIX, Doc. 256 pp. 746-747;
65 See J. Summers (ed.) Peoples and International Law: How Nationalism and Self-
Determination Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations, Dordrecht, 2007, p. 237; See also See 
A. Movchan, ‘Problems of Boundaries and Security in the Helsinki Declaration’, Recueil des 
Cours, 1977, no. 154, p. 24.
66 US Mission Geneva telegram 1975GENEVA05273, ‘CSCE: Peaceful Change of Frontiers - 
State of Play’, dated 8 July 1975.
67 During the negotiations only four countries – the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, France and 
the Netherlands - officially submitted proposals for this principle. See Doc. USSR, CSCE/I/3, 
<UN> <UN>
Downloaded from Brill.com12/08/2018 04:36:49PM
via Bilkent University
406 R. Sadigbayli / Security and Human Rights 24 (2013) 392–417 
they viewed it as a permanent, continuing right of peoples to political and 
social change within societies, focusing on the internal aspect of self-deter-
mination.68 Because this concept expands the definitions previously elabo-
rated in the U.N. documents, it is this internal aspect of the realization of 
the right to self-determination that is considered to be an innovative part of 
the Final Act.69
Third, because the majority of the participating States, Western and 
Eastern European alike, had national minorities on their territories, their 
primary concern was how to ensure that this principle would not poten-
tially endanger the unity and territorial integrity of States.70 Canada 
expressed concerns with the French proposal to include a reference to self-
determination within the principle of the inviolability of frontiers, citing 
not only ‘internal considerations’ (i.e. the question of Quebec), but also the 
implication of this text as encouragement for separatist movements in 
other countries.71 Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Romania and Poland agreed to 
give their consent to the provisional registration of this principle on condi-
tion that a balancing provision would be later added thereto coupled with 
a ‘satisfactory formulation’ of the principle of the territorial integrity of 
States.72 These countries also sought to reinforce this safeguard clause 
by establishing a clear interrelationship between all the principles of the 
Final Act.73
As a result this principle was approved with an unequivocal safeguard 
clause therein stating that the participating States will ‘…[act] at all times 
in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Netherlands, CSCE/II/A/8, France, CSCE/II/A/12, Yugoslavia, CSCE/I/28 and CSCE/II/A/5; 
Federal Republic of Germany Doc. CSCE/I/RV.3 and CSCE/III/PV.2.
68 See A. Cassese, ‘The Approach of the Helsinki Declaration to Human Rights’, in 
M. Dominick (ed.) Human Rights and the Helsinki Accord: A Five Year Road to Madrid, Buffalo, 
1981, p. 38; A. Cassese (ed.) Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge, 
1995, pp. 282, 283, 286 and 287; Yugoslavia, CSCE/III/PV.4.
69 See A. Cassese, ‘The Helsinki Declaration and Self-Determination’ in T. Buergenthal 
(ed.) Human Rights, International Law and the Helsinki Accord, Montclair, 1977, p. 103.
70 See Memorandum of Conversation between H. Sonnenfeldt, Counselor at the State 
Department and Mr. Guenther van Well, Assistant Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of FRG, 5 December 1974, Foreign Relations of the United States 1969–1976, European 
Security, Vol. XXXIX, Doc. 264, p. 772; See H. Russel, Supra note 44 at 269.
71 US Mission NATO telegram 1973NATO04218, ‘CSCE - Principles Guiding Relations 
among States’, dated 7 September 1973.
72 See CSCE Journal No. 240 (1975). See also US Mission Geneva telegram 1975GENEVA01143, 
‘CSCE: Provisional registration of self-determination principle’, dated 20 February 1975.
73 See statements by Cyprus and Romania, CSCE Journal No. 240 (1975). See also Ferraris, 
L.V. (ed.). Report on a Negotiation: Helsinki-Geneva-Helsinki 1972-1975, Geneva, 1979, 
pp. 142, 150.
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Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those 
relating to territorial integrity of States.’74 The drafters balanced the exter-
nal aspect of self-determination with other principles, including territorial 
integrity, the inviolability of frontiers, as well as the non-use of force and 
non-intervention.75 Just like in other international instruments, this ‘bal-
ancing’ technique applied in the Final Act had the obvious intent to restrict 
the scope of self-determination.76
Fourth, the participating States borrowed the concept within the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and deliberately excluded 
national minorities from the scope of application of the self-determination 
principle by drawing a distinction between ‘people’ (i.e. the entire popula-
tion of States), who are seen as beneficiaries of this right under the 
Covenant, and national minorities.77 Under the same construct for the pro-
tection of minority rights they designed a separate principle VII.78
It is noteworthy that in order to prevent any negative consequences that 
the protection of minority rights could have on the territorial integrity of 
States, the participating States pledged to respect ‘the right of persons 
belonging to … minorities’, putting emphasis on the protection of the 
human rights of individuals, rather than groups as a whole.79 Early on in 
the process of standard-setting for the protection of minority rights, there-
fore, the participating States saw this as a security issue (they discussed this 
issue in Basket I dealing with security aspects of the Helsinki Declaration) 
74 See CSCE/II/A/137.
75 See J. Summers ‘Peoples and International Law’ Supra note 65, p. 237.
76 Ibid., p. 141.
77 See General Comment 23, ‘The rights of minorities’ (Article 27), (Fiftieth session, 
1994), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (1994), Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Retrieved 7 November 2013, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/fb7fb12c2fb8bb21c1 
2563ed004df111. See A. Cassese, ‘The Helsinki Declaration and Self-Determination’, Supra 
note 69, p. 102; A. Cassese, ‘Self-Determination of Peoples’, Supra note 68, pp. 283-285; Also 
Ibid., Note 17 at 289; G. Arangio-Ruiz, ‘Human Rights and Non-Intervention in the Helsinki 
Final Act’, Recueil des Cours, 1977, no. 157, p. 220.
78 See H. Russel, Supra note 44, pp. 269-270; A. Cassese, ‘The Helsinki Declaration and 
Self-Determination’, Supra note 69, pp. 101-102; See also J. Wright, ‘The OSCE and the 
Protection of Minority Rights’, Human Rights Quarterly, 1996, no. 18, pp. 193-196; H. Heintze, 
‘Contradictory Principles in the Helsinki Final Act?’, in OSCE Yearbook 2004, p. 293; 
T. Buergenthal, ‘The CSCE Rights System’, George Washington Journal of International Law 
and Economics, 1991-1992, no. 25, pp. 342-343.
79 Note that France was opposed to designating minority groups as a whole as beneficia-
ries of this right. See A. Akermark (ed.) Justifications of Minority Protection in International 
Law, (London, The Hague, Boston, 1997, p. 270; A. Heraclides, ‘The CSCE and Minorities: the 
Negotiations behind the Commitments, 1972-1992’, Helsinki Monitor, 1992, no. 3, pp. 6-8.
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and as will be discussed below were mindful to ensure that minority pro-
tection does not infringe upon the territorial integrity of States.80
Reinforcing the norm of territorial integrity
As was mentioned above a number of participating States wanted to bal-
ance the right to self-determination with the obligation of States ‘…to 
abstain from undertaking or encouraging any action likely to imperil or 
threaten, wholly or in part, the territorial integrity or national unity of any 
of the participating States’.81 They sought to establish a balance between 
the rights and obligations of States by expressing territorial integrity in 
forceful terms and by inserting a clause on the interdependence of princi-
ples.82 Canada and a number of other States wanted to have additional 
safeguards that referred to the possibility of a peaceful change of borders 
and self-determination as not undermining the territorial integrity of States 
and insisted on including in this principle a ban on actions against the 
‘unity’ of participating States.83 As a result, the Final Act reaffirms the obli-
gation to respect the territorial integrity of States in every provision dealing 
with territorial issues.
Both the Western and East European delegations wanted to make sure 
that the territorial integrity principle was not confined to a general prohibi-
tion of the use of force against territorial integrity and was as broad as pos-
sible.84 Consequently, this principle underlines that States ‘will refrain from 
any action … against the territorial integrity…’.
In lieu of a conclusion: the general practice of States as  
an  interpretation of the Final Act principles
A review of the drafting history of the Final Act does not support the propo-
sition voiced by some that there is an inherent conflict within the Helsinki 
Accords. Despite the seemingly conflicting objectives of the rival blocs the 
80 Petra Roter (Ed.), “Managing the ‘minority problem’ in Post-Cold War Europe within 
the Framework of a Multilayered Regime for the Protection of National Minorities”, European 
Yearbook of Minority Issues, 2001-2002, no. 1, pp. 87, 95-96.
81 See e.g. Statement by Romania, CSCE Journal No. 240 (1975).
82 Ibid.
83 H. Russel, Supra note 44 at 265.
84 Spain, CSCE/II/A/13, H. Russel, Supra note 44 at 253.
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participating States were able to arrive at an important consensus as far as 
borders are concerned, because they shared a common goal of détente that 
was not possible without renouncing the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity of States and arbitrarily changing the boundaries of 
States through violent means. The focus of the negotiations was therefore 
not on the validity of the principles per se (nobody questioned the validity, 
under international law, of these principles, which are enshrined in the 
U.N. Charter and are binding upon all States), but on reconciling the invio-
lability of frontiers with the possibility for their peaceful change. This was 
achieved by placing the peaceful change of frontiers clause under the sov-
ereign equality principle, underlining that the peaceful adjustment of fron-
tiers is a matter pertaining to the sovereign prerogatives of States. The 
participating States agreed that this change is possible with due regard to 
international law and with the consent of the States concerned, thus ruling 
out unilateral, non-consensual actions.
The Final Act was constructed so that all principles are ‘equally and unre-
servedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the 
others’ and to ‘…ensure to each participating State the benefits resulting 
from the respect and application of these principles by all.’ That said, not 
only the realization of the principle of self-determination should not violate 
the territorial integrity of States and the inviolability of their frontiers, but 
any exercise of this principle should not contradict the requirement of con-
sent stipulated in the peaceful change clause.85 Clearly, the drafters of the 
Final Act did not view the self-determination principle as granting a right of 
secession.86 Moreover, this provision can hardly be interpreted as such, 
given that no international recognition of the right of secession existed 
under customary international law at the time when the Final Act was 
drafted.87 A comparison of the self-determination text in the Final 
Act with that of the Friendly Relations Declaration reveals that the 
participating States purposefully chose less forceful terms in framing this 
85 J. Salo, ‘Self-Determination: An Overview of History and Present State with Emphasis 
on the CSCE Process’, 2 Finnish Yearbook of International Law, 1991, no. 2, p. 316.
86 See A. Cassese, ‘The Helsinki Declaration and Self-Determination’, Supra note 69, 
pp. 84, 104; See also R. Emerson, ‘Self-Determination’, The American Journal of International 
Law, 1971, no. 65, p. 464; G. Arangio-Ruiz, ‘Human Rights and Non-Intervention in the 
Helsinki Final Act’, Recueil des Cours , 1977, no. 157, p. 223; H. Hazewinkel, ‘Self-determination, 
territorial integrity and the OSCE’, Helsinki Monitor, 2007, no. 18, p. 296.
87 See L. Seshagiri, ‘Democratic Disobedience: Reconceiving Self-Determination 
and Secession at International Law’, 51 Harvard International Law Journal, 2010, no. 51, 
p. 555.
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principle in the Final Act, which supports the earlier conclusion.88 The dis-
cussions during the drafting of the Final Act indicate that this was meant not 
to establish a linkage between the self-determination concept in the Friendly 
Relations Declaration89 and the rather restrictive principle in the Final Act.
The decisions and documents adopted within the OSCE framework and 
the practice of States in applying the Helsinki Final Act principles over the 
past two decades suggest that this interpretation was not affected by the 
changed circumstances and political developments on the European conti-
nent. This principle is not interpreted as a right of secession forty years 
after the signing of the Final Act, specifically in the context of the pro-
tracted conflicts in the OSCE area.90 On the contrary, the general view is 
that secession movements in the territory of the former Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia have not created a secession right under customary interna-
tional law.91 The Final Act is still regarded as an instrument which further 
institutionalizes the stability of borders principle.92
88 Т. Мусаев, ‘Косово и Притязания Армении на Нагорно-Карабахский Регион 
Азербайджана: Сравнительный Правовой Анализ’ (2013) (in Russian).
89 Although the drafters of the Friendly Relations Declaration made it clear that the Self-
determination principle does not grant a right to secede and should not result in a disrup-
tion of the territorial integrity of States, some scholars argue that an inverted reading of the 
safeguard clause in Principle V of the Declaration gives rise to the doctrine of remedial 
secession. See G. Bolton & G. Visoka, ‘Recognizing Kosovo’s Independence: Remedial 
Secession or Earned Sovereignty?’ (2010), Occasional Paper, No. 11/10, St. Antony’s College, 
University of Oxford, Retrieved 5 November 2013, http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/seesox/pdf/
RecognizingKosovosindependence.pdf. For the Official Records of the UN General Assembly 
drafting history of the Friendly Relations Declaration see Report of the Special Committee 
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States, UN Doc. A/7326 (November 1968), para. 164, p. 61 and para. 189, p. 66; and Report UN 
Doc. A/8018, Supplement No. 18 (May 1970), para. 78, p. 51 and para. 108, p. 77, para. 279, p 110.
90 See Opinion Nos. 2 & 3 of the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia 
(known as the Badinter Arbitration Committee) set up by the Council of Ministers of the 
European Economic Community in August 1991, published in the European Journal of 
International Law, 1992, no. 3. Retrieved 25 October 2013, http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/con-
tent/3/1/178.full.pdf+html; See also I. Brownlie, ‘International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary 
of the United Nations’, Recueil des Cours , 1995, no. 255, pp. 55-61; T. Musayev, ‘Advisory 
Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: 
Comparative Analysis’, Baku, 2011.
91 L. Eastwood Jr., ‘Secession: State Practice and International Law after the Dissolution 
of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia’, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, 1993, 
no. 3, p. 329. Retrieved 30 October 2013, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djcil/vol3/iss2/2; 
See also H. Hazewinkel, ‘Self-determination, territorial integrity and the OSCE’, Helsinki 
Monitor, 2007, no. 18, p. 300;
92 See M. Zacher, ‘The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use 
of Force’, International Organization , 2001, no. 55, p. 237. Retrieved 15 October 2013, http://
byers.typepad.com/files/zacher-on-territorial-integrity-1.pdf.
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The Charter of Paris for a New Europe adopted by the CSCE in November 
1990 as a response to the new political and territorial situation in Europe 
reaffirmed that ‘[i]n accordance with our obligations under the Charter of 
the United Nations and commitments under the Helsinki Final Act, we 
renew our pledge to refrain from the threat or use of force against the ter-
ritorial integrity or political independence of any State, or from acting in 
any other manner inconsistent with the principles or purposes of those 
documents.’93
The wording self-determination in the Paris Charter also differs from 
principle VIII in the Final Act in a significant way. In the face of rising 
nationalism and territorial conflicts across the OSCE area the participating 
States deliberately omitted any reference to the internal and external 
aspects of this principle and its universal significance not to provide an 
incentive for interpreting the Final Act principles as justifying revisionist 
claims.94
This approach is also clearly visible in the policies of the OSCE countries 
vis-à-vis the newly emerged independent States and towards ethnic ten-
sions and territorial conflicts in the OSCE area. This general policy is three-
fold and includes the recognition of existing boundaries, the non-recognition 
of secessionist entities and the development of a framework to protect 
minority rights without jeopardizing the territorial integrity of States.
In December 1991 the European Council therefore adopted a declaration 
on the disintegration process in the Soviet Union, in which it underlined 
the importance of respecting the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and 
recalled that ‘…according to these provisions, the frontiers of all States in 
Europe are inviolable and can only be changed by peaceful means and 
agreement.’95 Later in its ‘Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in 
Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union’, the European Council reiterated 
this approach as far as the borders of the newly emerged States of the for-
mer Soviet Union are concerned, and emphasized that ‘[t]he Community 
and its Member States will not recognize entities which are the result of 
aggression.’96
93 See ‘Charter of Paris for A New Europe’, (1990), Retrieved, 10 November 2013, www.osce 
.org/mc/39516.
94 See J. Summers (Ed.) ‘Peoples and International Law’ Supra note 65, pp. 239-241.
95 European Council Presidency Conclusions, EU Doc. 271/1/91, Maastricht, 9- 10 
December 1991. Retrieved 10 November 2013, http://www.european-council.europa.eu/
media/848626/1991_december_-_maastricht__eng_.pdf.
96 See EC Declaration on the “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern 
Europe and in the Soviet Union” (16 December 1991), reproduced in European Journal of 
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More recent practice of the OSCE participant States shows consistency in 
pursuing this policy. In order to reinforce the foundational principle of ter-
ritorial integrity and to prevent the erosion of this norm in the wake of the 
declaration of independence by Kosovo, the European countries were 
quick to underscore that the Kosovo decision is a unique case and will not 
have implications for the interpretation of the Helsinki Final Act. 
Specifically, the European Council in its Conclusions on Kosovo in 2008 
reiterated ‘…the EU’s adherence to the principles of the U.N. Charter and 
the Helsinki Final Act, inter alia the principles of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and all UN Security Council resolutions’ and underlined its con-
viction that ‘…in view of the conflict of the 1990s and the extended period 
of international administration under SCR 1244, Kosovo constitutes a sui 
generis case which does not call into question these principles and 
resolutions.’97
The majority of States that submitted statements to the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) with regard to the request by the U.N. General 
Assembly to render an advisory opinion on the unilateral declaration of 
independence by Kosovo, and even the authors of this declaration inter-
preted the primary significance of the Helsinki Final Act principles as pro-
hibiting any forceful action against the territorial boundaries of States.98 In 
its ruling the ICJ reaffirmed the obligation of States not to recognize as legal 
unilateral declarations of independence ‘…connected with the unlawful 
use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international 
law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens).’99
In response to the conflicts in the Balkans the participating States reiter-
ated their ‘…determination…never to recognize any changes of borders, 
whether external or internal, brought about by force’.100 For the same rea-
son, the OSCE participating States and the international community at 
large do not recognize the separatist entities in the OSCE area, namely 
International Law, 1993, no. 4. Retrieved 10 November 2013, http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/
content/4/1/66.full.pdf+html.
97 See Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on Kosovo (6496/08), 18 
February 2008. Retrieved 10 October 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms 
_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/98818.pdf.
98 See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2010. Retrieved 30 October 2013, http://
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf; For the individual statements by countries, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=21&case=141&code=kos&p3=1.
99 Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 81, p. 437.
100 See Third Additional Meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials, The Situation in 
Yugoslavia, Annex to Journal No. 11, Prague, 10 October 1991.
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those in the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia, in the Nagorno-
Karabakh region of Azerbaijan as well as the Transdnistria region of 
Moldova, and reaffirm the sovereignty and territorial integrity of these 
States.101 For example, the EU in its statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict of May 1992 condemned ‘in particular as contrary to these [OSCE] 
principles and commitments any actions against territorial integrity or 
designed to achieve political goals by force, including the driving out of 
civilian populations.’102 In its statement of November 1993 the EU called 
upon the Armenian forces to withdraw from the occupied territories of 
Azerbaijan and underlined that ‘[t]he European Union reiterates the 
importance it attaches to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE.’103 
The OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs tasked to mediate between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan also reiterated that they ‘…reaffirm their support for the 
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and thus do not recognize the indepen-
dence of Nagorny Karabakh.’104
The Helsinki Final Act principles were interpreted in a similar way in the 
context of the conflicts in Georgia. For example, in its extraordinary meet-
ing of September 2008 the European Council condemned Russia’s unilat-
eral decision to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
and recalled that ‘…a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict in Georgia 
must be based on full respect for the principles of independence, sover-
eignty and territorial integrity recognized by international law, the Final 
101 See the UN Security Council Resolutions S/RES/822 (1993), S/RES/853 (1993), 
S/RES/874 (1993) and S/RES/884 (1993) as well as UN General Assembly Resolution 
A/RES/62/243 (2008) in the context of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and S/RES/896 
(1994), S/RES/906 (1994), S/RES/1752 (2007) in the context of Georgia; European Council 
Conclusions on the Republic of Moldova, 2950th General Affairs Council meeting, 
Luxembourg, (2009); See also NATO Summit Declaration, issued by the Heads of State and 
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago, 20 May 
2012. Retrieved 15 September 2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87593 
.htm.
102 See Statement on Nagorno-Karabakh, European Political Cooperation (EPC) press 
release, Brussels, 22 May 1992, published in the European Political Cooperation Documentation 
Bulletin (1992), Vol. 8, Doc. 92/201, p. 260. Retrieved 25 October 2013, http://aei.pitt 
.edu/36872/1/A2881.pdf.
103 See Statement on Nagorno-Karabakh, European Political Cooperation (EPC) press 
release, Brussels, 9 November 1993, published in the European Political Cooperation 
Documentation Bulletin (1993), Vol. 9, Doc. 93/448, p. 532. Retrieved 25 October 2013, http://
aei.pitt.edu/36868/1/A2877.pdf.
104 See Verbatim Record of the 86th plenary meeting of the UNGA Sixty-second session, 
14 March 2008, U.N. Doc. A/62/PV.86, available at <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view 
_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/62/243&Lang=E>.
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Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and 
United Nations Security Council resolutions.’105
For these reasons the European States and institutions not only support 
the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova, but also rein-
force the policy of the non-recognition of separatist entities by declaring all 
acts enacted by the separatists null and void. For example, in the context of 
the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict the European Court of Human Rights in 
its admissibility decision in the ‘Elkhan Chiragov and Others v. Armenia’ 
case concluded that ‘…the “NKR” is not recognised as a State under interna-
tional law by any countries or international organizations… [and] the 
invoked laws cannot be considered legally valid…’.106 Similarly, the EU con-
sistently refuses to recognize as legitimate the ‘constitutional and legal 
framework’ of the mock elections held by the separatist regimes in the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
in Georgia.107
Most recently, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on 
the Conflict in Georgia, which reviewed the applicable Helsinki Final 
Act principles in the context of this conflict, concluded that the realiza-
tion of the self-determination principle beyond its internal aspect within 
the framework of a State will make the Helsinki Final Act principles 
incompatible.108
The overall purpose of the Final Act that codifies the stability of borders 
principle, the restricted scope of self-determination and, in general, the 
105 Presidency Conclusions, Extraordinary European Council Meeting, Brussels, 
1 September 2008, EU Doc 12594/2/08 REV 2. Retrieved 5 November 2013, www.consilium 
.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/…/en/ec/102545.pdf.
106 See ECHR, Grand Chamber Decision on Application no. 13216/05 (Elkhan Chiragov 
and Others against Armenia), December 2011, para. 102, p. 25, Retrieved 19 October 2013, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-108383.
107 See also Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on Nagorno-Karabakh, 
EU Doc A 333/12, 18 July 2012, Retrieved 10 October 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131842.pdf; Statement by the spokesperson of 
EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the elections in the breakaway region of South 
Ossetia in Georgia, 14 November 2011, EU Doc. A 453/11. Retrieved 10 October 2013, http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126038.pdf; 
Statement by the spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the elec-
tions in the breakaway region of Abkhazia in Georgia, 27 August 2011, EU Doc. A 334/11. 
Retrieved 10 October 2013, http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/
EN/foraff/124445.pdf;
108 See the Report by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict 
in Georgia (IIFFMCG) based on the EU Council decision of 2 December 2008 (Council 
Decision 2008/901/CFSP), Vol. II, pp. 135-137. Retrieved 30 October 2013, http://www.ceiig.ch/
Report.html.
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ongoing debate on the scope of applicability of this principle, as was con-
firmed by the recent ICJ ruling on Kosovo,109 prompted the OSCE partici-
pating States not to import this theoretical discourse into the interpretation 
of the Helsinki Final Act principles. Instead, they upheld the original con-
struct within the Final Act and used certain tools, specifically those embed-
ded in principle VII and dealing with the protection of minority rights, 
designed by the drafters specifically to address conflict-prone situations 
related to minorities. This explains why the protection of the rights of 
minorities and the development of international standards on their protec-
tion gained prominence within the OSCE and other European institutions 
over the past decades.110
These instruments reflect the general understanding that the scope of 
application of minority rights should not disrupt the unity and territorial 
integrity of States. For example, the OSCE in its major Copenhagen 
Document on the protection of minority rights underscored that ‘[n]one of 
these commitments [by the OSCE States] may be interpreted as implying 
any right to engage in any activity or perform any action in contravention 
of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, other 
obligations under international law or the provisions of the Final Act, 
including the principle of territorial integrity of States’.111 The United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities112 and the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of 
Europe113 also contain such restrictive clauses.
These international standards are increasingly used as a principal 
framework of analysis and as a tool to address tensions involving national 
109 See I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 82, p. 438.
110 A. Phillips, ‘The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: 
A Policy Analysis’, Minority Rights Group International Policy Paper, (September 2002). 
Retrieved 15 October 2013, www.minorityrights.org. H. Heintze, ‘Contradictory Principles in 
the Helsinki Final Act?’, in IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2004, Hamburg, 2004. Retrieved 10 
October 2013, http://www.core-hamburg.de/CORE_English/pub_osce_inh_04.htm.
111 See paragraph 37 of the ‘Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on 
the Human Dimension of the CSCE’ (1990), Retrieved 29 October 2013, www.osce.org/odihr/
elections/14304.
112 See Article 8(4) of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992), UNGA Doc. A/RES/47/135, Retrieved 29 
October 2013, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r135.htm.
113 See preamble and Article 21 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities of the Council of Europe, (1995). Retrieved 29 October 2013, http:// 
conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/157.htm.
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minorities in the OSCE area.114 As a solution to potential conflicting situa-
tions the Copenhagen Document suggests establishing appropriate local or 
autonomous administrations, thus indicating that the OSCE favours a solu-
tion to these problems within the framework of the internationally recog-
nized borders of States.115 The OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities further elaborated self-government and autonomy as tools for 
the integration of minorities into public life within the States.116 Although 
the general view is that minorities do not enjoy the right to self-determina-
tion,117 for the sake of reconciling the principles of self-determination and 
the territorial integrity of States, autonomy arrangements and self-gover-
nance are increasingly accepted as methods to realize the internal aspect of 
the right of self-determination and a resolution of conflicts.118 This has 
found some practical application in the OSCE proposals to address the pro-
tracted conflicts.119
Any reinterpretation of the Final Act principles in contravention of its 
primary purpose will undoubtedly reopen them to renegotiation that 
would upset the hard-earned balance in the Final Act and would contradict 
the spirit of the Helsinki Accords. This explains why there seems to be a 
consensus within the OSCE that the principles are enduring and should be 
114 K. Huber & R. Zaagman, ‘Towards the prevention of ethnic conflict in CSCE: The High 
Commissioner on National Minorities and Other Developments’, International Journal of 
Group Rights, 1993, no. 1.
115 See Supra note 111, para. 35, p. 20.
116 See ‘The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities 
in Public Life & Explanatory Note’ (1999), OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. 
Retrieved 5 November 2013, www.osce.org/hcnm/30325.
117 See T.M. Franck et al., ‘The Territorial Integrity of Québec in the Event of the 
Attainment of Sovereignty’ (1992) in A. Bayefsky (ed.), Self-Determination in International 
Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned, The Hague, 2000, p. 294.
118 G. Welhengama, ‘The Legitimacy of Minorities Claim for Autonomy through the Right 
to Self-Determination', Nordic Journal of International Law, 1999, no. 68; S. Vasilev, ‘The 
HCNM approach to Conflict Prevention’, Helsinki Monitor,1999, no. 10, pp. 56-57; H. Heintze, 
‘Contradictory Principles in the Helsinki Final Act?’, in OSCE Yearbook 2004, pp. 295, 297-298; 
D. Turk, ‘Towards a new security architecture in the OSCE area: How to include human 
rights?’ in Security and Human Rights, 2010, no. 21, p. 57; J. Salo, ‘Self-Determination: An 
Overview of History and Present State with Emphasis on the CSCE Process’, Finnish Yearbook 
of International Law, 1991, no.2, p. 320.
119 See e.g. Statement by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office on the principles which should 
form part of the settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which 
call inter alia for ‘…an agreement based on self-determination which confers on Nagorno-
Karabakh the highest degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan’, Lisbon Document (1996), 
Retrieved 30 October 2013, http://www.osce.org/mc/39539.
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120 See e.g. Statements by the European Union and the US in response to the OSCE CiO 
Report on the progress made under the Helsinki + 40 process, Supra note 3.
left untouched.120 If so, then the participating States should take advantage 
of the upcoming Final Act anniversary not only to reaffirm the principles, 
but to reconfirm their original meaning as designed some forty years ago. 
The choice is clear: to continue unhelpful and often destructive discourse 
on a perceived contradiction between the principles, thus contributing to 
the protracted nature of unresolved conflicts, or take the path of employing 
the tools built within the Final Act and developed over the past years to 
address conflicting situations without jeopardizing the unity and territorial 
integrity of States.
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